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1 Introduction 
In sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), financial markets have played a very limited role in the 
mobilization of resources to facilitate growth-enhancing private investments. Despite 
various efforts through financial sector reforms, financial markets remain largely 
fragmented with substantial gaps in the financing of economic activities by private 
agents. Based on findings from surveys of formal and informal financial institutions and 
their clients in Ghana, Malawi, Nigeria and Tanzania,1 we argued elsewhere (Nissanke and 
Aryeetey 1998; Aryeetey et. al 1997) that the continuous poor performance of financial 
systems can be partly explained by the high degree of financial market fragmentation. 
The growing literature on institutional economics provides clues to possible sources of 
this market condition. In contrast to the Walrasian notion of markets, institutional 
economics views markets as broad institutional structures and arrangements that support 
and govern the process of exchange with the aim of minimizing transaction costs. Like 
any other institutions, markets exist to reduce uncertainty by establishing a stable 
structure to human exchange and interaction (North 1990). Specifically, as social 
institutions, markets structure, organize, and legitimize contractual agreements and the 
exchange of property rights. In this context, Coase (1992) outlines the concept of 
efficient property rights, since the institutional setting that governs the exchange 
process, including an appropriate system of property rights, becomes an important 
prerequisite for the efficient functioning of markets. In Coase’s view, the efficient 
system of property rights is the one that results in minimizing transaction costs for 
market operations. 
Advancing the theory of imperfect information, Stiglitz (1989) also defines markets as an 
important set of institutions. In particular, it is emphasized that markets operate in 
environments characterized by imperfect, costly, and incomplete information, and 
hence, appropriate governance mechanisms are required to eschew the agency problems 
arising from opportunistic behaviour, including moral hazard and adverse incentives. 
Thus, institutions are seen to be created and refined to deal with various forms of market 
failure. 
Indeed, Stiglitz’s theory of imperfect information is in many respects comparable to the 
analysis advanced by institutional economists such as Coase (1992), North (1990) and 
Williamson (1985, 1995). Both schools criticize the conventional neo-classical model 
for failing to include the role of transaction costs in exchange and for its inability to 
explain the role of institutions in the formation and operation of markets by minimizing 
transaction costs and reducing uncertainty. Both schools emphasize the costliness and 
incompleteness of information and enforcement on which agents in the real world have 
to act.  
Indeed, emphasizing the presence of perverse market failures, other institutional 
economists such as Aoki (2001) and Young (1998) conduct their institutional analysis 
more or less exclusively on agents’ behaviour and their strategic interactions in a game-
                                                 
1   For detailed fieldwork methodology, samples and results, see Aryeetey (1994, 1996), Bagachwa (1995, 
1996), Chipeta and Mkandawire (1996a, 1996b), Soyibo (1996a, 1996b).   2
theoretic framework, providing a ‘behavioural’ micro analytic perspective of 
institutions. Thus, they focus more on the dimension of institutions as outcomes of 
game equilibria, in particular as those of repeated games. 
Arrow (1998) further notes that the role of non-market institutions is to coordinate 
expectations as well as to enforce incentives in the presence of asymmetry of 
information, market failure (particularly with regard to contingent future markets), and 
the need for coordination due to externalities and increasing returns. In this sense, 
institutions could be seen as serving as mechanisms and means to deal with a whole set 
of market failures (for example: public goods, externalities, imperfect and costly 
information, and the wedge between social and private benefits/returns). As Bardhan 
(2005) notes, one of critical functions of institutions is to correct coordination failures. 
Institutional economics has comparative advantages over the standard static economic 
theory in dealing with the determinants of change over time as it places the nature and 
sources of dynamism at the centre of analysis (Harriss et al. 1995; Bardhan 1989).2 It 
can offer a coherent account of institutional changes necessary for economic 
development and market transformation. For example, North (1989, 1990) suggests that 
the sources of low-growth are associated with the inability of economies to transform 
institutional structures in response to new technological and market opportunities. More 
specifically, he explains the evolution and transformation of markets as social 
institutions in terms of a trade-off between transaction costs and economies of scale, as 
increasing specialization and division of labour proceeds. 
North (1989) sees the evolution of markets as a movement from personal exchange 
towards the impersonal exchange of modern economies. Personal exchange involves 
local trade where specialization and division of labour are extremely limited, and 
individuals often engage in repeated dealings among themselves in a geographically and 
socially confined community setting. Transaction costs in personal exchanges are low, 
because transactions are governed by social codes and norms with minimum monitoring 
and enforcement costs. Personal exchange then evolves into limited impersonalized 
exchange that involves some long distance and cross-cultural trade. This type of exchange 
requires governance mechanisms, which, in historical terms, would involve dependence on 
kinship links, bonding of labour, the exchange of hostages, or a merchant code of conduct. 
Finally the advanced impersonal exchange of modern economies emerges. This requires 
third-party enforcement rules and other elaborate institutional structures to reduce 
transaction costs with effective formal systems of monitoring and mechanisms for 
enforcing contracts and property rights. An extensive informational network which can 
provide market participants with timely and comprehensive information is another 
critical prerequisite for market development. For markets to operate efficiently, access 
to information should not be discriminatory and rules governing market operations 
should be transparent and comprehensible to all market participants. 
Importantly, North emphasizes that market transformation from the stage of 
personalized exchange towards the modern impersonal mode of exchange does not 
necessarily take place automatically. For markets to transform and graduate to a higher 
                                                 
2   For more detailed discussion on the evolution and dynamics of institutional changes, see Nissanke and 
Sindzingre (2005).   3
stage, an appropriate institutional environment and governance structure should be 
developed to reduce uncertainties and transaction costs. The history of commerce 
illustrates how this requirement led to the formation and rise of city states initially and 
nation states later on, which were capable of specifying property rights and enforcing 
contracts (North 1989, 1990). There was a need for self-enforcing institutions and 
sanctions for free riding and the breach of norms as foundations for impersonal 
exchanges, trade, credit, and markets as shown in the examples of the differences in 
guilds and business coalitions between the medieval Maghribi and Genoese traders 
(Greif 1993; Greif et al. 1994). These studies underscore the importance of establishing 
credibility in institutional environments and arrangements. 
In our view, this analytical perspective of market evolution provides a refreshing 
framework for understanding the institutional sources and constraints of market 
fragmentation observed in SSA. One of the critical questions to be raised in the context of 
sub-Saharan economies is why informal financial institutions find it hard to transform and 
graduate into formal institutions that could handle more impersonal financial transactions. 
What are the institutional constraints for their successful graduation? Which kinds of costs 
are involved for their transformation (transformation costs), so that the process of market 
expansion and deepening could take place with the supporting institutional structure?3 
What is a real impediment that hinders institutional innovation for market development 
in Africa?4 
A further interesting twist comes from the fact that the market structure prevailing in these 
economies is not an outcome of the natural course of market evolution, with the realization 
of higher rates of return through the gradual formalization of markets as the channel. In 
SSA economies, as in many other developing economies, formal institutions co-exist 
alongside informal traditional institutions as a result of modern institutional structures 
being superimposed on traditional societies, often without necessary adaptations. This 
condition could result in an extreme form of market fragmentation and segmentation 
with few effective linkages between formal and informal institutions.5 Consequently, 
the financial system as a whole is unable to deal with the risks inherent in SSA 
economies. 
Conceptually distinguishing fragmentation from segmentation-cum-specialization, this 
paper examines the institutional source of market fragmentation by analysing how 
financial risks are managed in different market segments and what sort of transaction 
costs are incurred by formal and informal institutions in the process of loan screening 
and loan monitoring and contract enforcement.6 It evaluates the implications of the 
                                                 
3   Here, we define transformation costs in relation to market transformation as the costs involved in 
transforming the form and nature of modes of market exchanges. Thus, they are different from those 
given by North (1990: 6). North’s transformation costs are referred to as the traditional production 
costs of capital, labour, technology, and natural resources. 
4   Fafchamps (2004) lists innovation failure, along with authority failure and coordination failure, as one 
of the critical features of financial markets in SSA. 
5   See Sindzingre (2006) for a critical assessment on a rather over-simplistic, dichotomizing application 
of the concepts of ‘formal’ and ‘informal’, found in institutional economics. Here, ‘formal’ and 
‘informal’ finance are used to follow the convention in the literature of financial economics. 
6   Conning and Udry (2005) also discuss fragmentation of rural financial markets in low income 
countries.   4
prevailing state of managing financial risks for market structures. It addresses the 
institutional constraints facing financial systems for market transformation and 
development.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the risk characteristics of African 
financial markets and a summary of the main features of performance in their formal 
and informal segments. Section 3 analyses the institutional arrangements of each market 
segment in handling credit risks. Section 4 presents our estimates of the transaction 
costs associated with the prevailing methods of risk management. Section 5 summarizes 
and concludes with an evaluation of the implications of these arrangements for the 
financial market landscape in SSA.  
2  Risk characteristics of African financial markets and institutional performance 
Lenders are generally exposed to two types of risk in their dealings with borrowers: 
systemic and idiosyncratic. The high systemic risk originates from unpredictable 
variations in income as a result of exogenous factors. The high idiosyncratic risk stems 
from the costly acquisition and asymmetric distribution of information, which can lead 
to the pervasive problem of moral hazard and adverse selection. Both types of risk are 
high in SSA countries. Systemic risks are high, as the economies are continuously exposed 
to large aggregate externally- and policy-generated shocks as well as to high political 
instability and civil strife (Collier 1996; Adam and O’Connell 1999). Consequently, 
economic transactions are conducted in highly uncertain and risky environments, which 
engender eminently more volatile returns to investment and highly variable income 
streams than in other parts of the world. 
The high-risk environment and the frequent incidence of large income shocks heighten 
demand for mechanisms and institutions for risk management, even if only for sheer 
survival. Indeed, in many low-income agriculture-based economies, where possibilities 
of risk management through upward diversification of economic activities have not 
been exploited, a variety of institutional arrangements such as sharecropping or labour-
migration have often served as risk-coping and risk-sharing as well as insurance 
mechanisms (Mordoch 1995; Bardhan and Udry 1999). However, where aggregate 
systemic risk is high, effective insurance against large income fluctuations is difficult to 
achieve through community-based risk-pooling mechanisms (Dercon 2004; Townsend 
1995; Conning and Udry 2005). Many recent empirical studies reveal only limited risk-
sharing even in small village communities.7 When insurance markets are missing and 
insurance possibilities are limited, an act of intertemporal trade to effect resource 
transfers over time such as saving and credit becomes vitally important for 
consumption-smoothing (Besley 1995a, 1995b). Credit transaction is seen as an 
insurance substitute in such circumstances, when market opportunities for risk-sharing 
are limited (Besley 1995b).8 Seasonal variability of agricultural production and income 
                                                 
7   See Conning and Udry (2005) for the results of empirical tests of the efficient risk-sharing and full 
insurance hypotheses. 
8   As Besley (1995b) notes, while the distinction between credit and insurance is often blurred, a pure 
credit arrangement rather than a contract with contingencies is unlikely to be optimal in many risky 
environments.   5
in rural areas provides an added imperative for short-run saving-credit facilities as a 
liquidity management device over the production cycles (Besley 1995b; Conning and 
Udry 2005). Thus, there is potentially immense demand for financial intermediation as 
an effective device of risk-pooling and risk-sharing in SSA. 
However, financial markets in SSA have been unsuccessful in meeting this potential 
demand for consumption-smoothing beyond spatially confined community levels as 
well as in serving the financial needs of real sector activities economy-wide. This 
condition partly reflects a typical dilemma associated with a vicious circle in under-
developed and less-diversified economies. The portfolio structure of both lenders and 
borrowers is constrained by low-risk diversification in their asset composition, making 
it difficult to offset financial loss in one activity against the gains from another through 
spatial risk-pooling. A wave of loan defaults triggered by an increase of systemic risk 
can be propagated nationwide due to the high risk-covariance of economic activities. At 
times of negative aggregate shocks a general crisis could ensue rapidly because the 
severely impaired net worth borrowers could lead to distress in the financial sector as 
lenders are incapable of dealing with high aggregate systemic risks. 
The underdeveloped financial markets in SSA can also be attributed to the high 
idiosyncratic risk lenders face when financial transactions are conducted beyond 
community levels because of poor endowments of information capital. This condition 
can be effectively analyzed with the aid of the recent theoretical advancement in 
information economics. Pioneered by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), a large number of 
theoretical papers have explored the implications of imperfect information and 
incomplete markets for contracts in credit markets in low-income environments.9 
For example, Hoff and Stiglitz (1990) and Conning and Udry (2005) explain 
segmentation into formal and informal markets typically observed in developing 
countries by the structural differences in the cost and risk characteristics of different 
types of transactions. This is a clear elevation from the previous, almost exclusive, 
reliance on the policy-based explanation embedded in the financial repression 
hypothesis (Fry 1982, 1988; Roe 1991) for this critical issue in finance and 
development. The financial repression hypothesis is mainly concerned with parallel 
market activities induced by pervasive government controls and regulations. While the 
new understanding derived from information economics points to a possibility of 
segmentation leading to market specialization, where each market segment serves 
specific market niches by exploiting comparative advantage for assessing borrower-
specific idiosyncratic risks in an environment of imperfect information. In the following 
sections, this theoretical perspective is adopted to explain the prevailing financial 
market structure in SSA. 
2.1  Performance of formal financial institutions 
By the early 1980s, the formal financial sector in many SSA countries had typically 
achieved a certain degree of diversity as a result of the efforts of the newly independent 
governments to re-shape the post-independence financial landscape. As part of their 
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of such studies.   6
independent nation-building programme, they established indigenous formal institutions 
and attempted to diversify the institutional structure of the financial system and 
extended banks' branch networks. However, the risk-management capacity of these 
formal financial institutions remained very restricted indeed. There is little doubt that 
the long history of wide-spread political interference and control of banks' operations 
impaired the risk-handling capacity of these institutions.  
Critically, the manner in which ‘repressive’ policies were implemented in SSA hindered 
the development of institutional capacity among financial institutions. The rationale of 
commercial viability was largely subsumed by the dictates of other government policy 
objectives, as well as political goals or capture (Nissanke and Aryeetey 1998; 
Brownbridge and Harvey 1998). Many banks, in particular those government-owned 
banks operating on a soft budget, failed to develop the capacity for risk assessment and 
monitoring of their loan portfolio. Savings mobilization was often not actively pursued. 
There was neither active liquidity and liability management nor any incentive to 
increase efficiency, often resulting in increased costs of financial intermediation. The 
regime of financial repression discouraged banks from investing in information capital, 
crucial for the development of financial systems. Institutions have typically been 
burdened with severe agency problems in dealing with idiosyncratic risks, that is, the 
problems caused by costly and imperfect information such as adverse selection, moral 
hazard, and contract enforcement (Nissanke and Aryeetey 1998).  
Financial sector reforms have been implemented to address the problems arising from 
repression, guided largely by policy prescriptions advanced by the financial repression 
school. Under the two fundamental premises of liberalization and balance-sheet 
restructuring, interest rates and credit allocation have been decontrolled and efforts have 
been made to strengthen the regulatory framework. Extensive restructuring and 
recapitalizing operations have been mounted for distressed banks.10 Despite the 
differences in initial conditions, policy sequence, and the pace of reforms, the expected 
positive effects from liberalization (in terms of savings mobilization and private sector 
credit availability) have been slow to emerge in all our case-study countries. 
Banks’ balance sheets remain precarious. In places like Ghana and Malawi, where 
reforms have been relatively orderly, most banking institutions have not yet developed 
the capacity for risk management. Instead, they continue to operate in an extremely 
constrained environment with underdeveloped institutional infrastructure and a poor 
information base. The portfolios of banking institutions have been continuously 
dominated by two characteristics: an extremely high incidence of non-performing loans 
and excess liquidity.11 The persistence of these conditions, despite radical changes in 
the policy environment, can be explained by the institutional environment that has 
restricted banks’ risk management and prevented improvement in their operational 
practice. 
                                                 
10  Popiel (1994) provides estimates that the cost of bank restructuring operations in about 20 SSA countries 
between 1984 and 1993 was often equivalent to between 7 per cent and 15 per cent of their gross 
domestic product (GDP). Deschamps and Bonnardeaux (1997) report that the direct cost of bank 
restructuring ranged from 20 to 50 per cent of GDP in the most affected SSA countries. 
11  See Chapter 4 of Nissanke and Aryeetey (1998) for a detailed analysis of these phenomena and factors 
explaining them.   7
The lack of changes in institutional environments explains the paucity of savings 
mobilization efforts, the ‘low-lending trap’ in the presence of latent excess demand for 
credit and loans, and the de-facto crowding out of private finance by public financial 
requirements. These factors have combined to form a general post-liberalization credit 
crunch in many countries, encouraged by the presence of high-yielding government 
paper or bank bills.12 
2.2 Informal  finance 
Informal financial transactions can be grouped into non-commercial, such as 
transactions between relatives and friends or small-scale group arrangements, and 
commercially-based, conducted by savings collectors, estate-owners, landlords, traders, 
and money-lenders.13 In SSA, most informal financial agents/arrangements tend to 
specialize in either lending or savings mobilization, while arrangements engaging in 
both activities typically provide their services to members only. 
Informal financial units have been developed in response to the demand from a distinct 
clientele, and each unit tends to serve a particular market niche (Aryeetey and Udry 
1997). Thus, the relative importance of different categories of the informal sector varies 
widely between countries in SSA. Furthermore, all four of our country studies suggest 
that the informal sector may far exceed the formal sector in coverage, influence, and 
even value transacted. Rather than a contraction in response to reform as predicted by 
the financial repression hypothesis, there has been a rapid increase in demand for 
informal savings and credit facilities in the more liberalized environment of recent 
years. 
The recent increase in demand for informal finance is related to the greater trading 
opportunities that emerged in the adjustment period. It can also be explained by an 
increase in unsatisfied demand for formal sector credit, which has been continuously 
restrained as part of stabilization efforts. While formal institutions have continued to 
find it hard to overcome their inherent constraints during the reform process it is the 
informal financial sector, demand-driven by its nature, that has responded first to the 
growing demand for financial services. 
However, informal activities continue to specialize in small and short-term transactions 
or seasonal requirements, such as cash-flow and liquidity management for consumption 
smoothing at a low-income equilibrium. Saving cycles are very short. For example, the 
facilities of savings collectors are used primarily to keep deposits secure and savings are 
returned to the depositors within the shortest possible time. Thus, in spite of the 
acknowledged potential of informal units as deposit mobilizers, they have never been 
seen as having a key role in financial intermediation in the region. While many informal 
                                                 
12   A similar condition is observed across many countries in SSA. See, for example, Kasekende and 
Atingi-Ego (2003) and Ngugi (2001) for Uganda and Kenya respectively. 
13    Besley (1995b) uses the term ‘nonmarket institution’ as a catchall for these different informal 
financial institutions in reference to the fact that these institutions make relatively little use of formal 
contractual obligations enforced through a codified legal system. For theoretical models of these 
nonmarket institutions such as group lending and credit cooperatives see Besley and Coate (1995) and 
Banerjee et al. (1994) respectively.    8
segments grew with demand for their services, they face difficulties moving beyond 
their particular sphere of specialization. Compared to other developing regions, informal 
operations in SSA have been more confined to traditional forms of activities without 
transforming into higher modes of operation. 
3 Institutional  arrangements for risk management 
With limited opportunities for risk management through income smoothing, borrowing 
in SSA is largely occasioned by the need to smooth consumption in the face of erratic 
income flows. As borrowers seek to cushion themselves against imminent consumption 
risk, they may choose to smooth consumption across time and space. Spatial 
consumption smoothing amounts to pooling idiosyncratic risks of people/households 
and co-insuring against risks (Besley 1995a, 1995b; Townsend 1995; Dercon 2004). 
The search for other households as an insurance often embraces such social features as 
ethnicity, religion, business relations, neighbourliness, kinship, and family because the 
effectiveness of mechanisms for containing idiosyncratic risk depends on the amount 
and quality of information on the part of insurers and the insured, and their ability to 
enforce the contracts. 
Dealing with idiosyncratic risks in lender-borrower interactions can be effectively 
characterized by a principal-agent relationship within a game theoretic framework 
(Conning and Udry 2005). In this relationship, lenders are preoccupied with the 
question of whether they will be repaid. When the effectiveness of formal legal 
enforcement mechanisms remains in doubt, the question of why borrowers bother to 
repay gains greater importance. If the relationship between borrower and lender is 
exclusive and repeat transaction is critical, as we find in many rural credit markets and 
most group arrangements, the promise of repeat borrowing and social sanctions serve as 
effective incentives for borrowers not to default. Clearly, borrowers repay loans for fear 
of losing access to future loans upon default (particularly in schemes involving groups). 
In addition, defaulters are generally sanctioned by the community as a whole. Social 
sanctions could include exclusion from other financial transactions (such as informal 
insurance) or other economic or social penalties. Social sanctions are available only in 
reasonably cohesive social groups, providing yet another reason for the propensity to 
transact credit within community-based groups. 
However, as credit relationships are extended beyond this ‘exclusive’ relationship and 
repeated personalized transactions, other institutional arrangements become necessary 
to sustain transactions. Collateral is one such institutional innovation to deal with the 
incentive problem. Collateral pledged in exchange for loans serves three important 
functions: (a) directly reducing cost to the lender of a loan default; (b) adding an 
incentive for the borrower to repay, thereby reducing the moral hazard; and 
(c) mitigating the problem of adverse selection by enabling the lender to screen out 
borrowers most likely to default (Udry 1990). 
Hence, a collateral asset should possess several attributes: (a) it must be easily 
appropriable by the lender; (b) it should have a secondary market; and (c) it should not 
itself be subject to moral hazard problems or other collateral specific risk (Binswanger 
et al. 1989). Although land is a preferred asset as collateral, land markets are often 
underdeveloped. Other assets commonly used as collateral in rural credit transactions   9
include jewellery or other household items as well as economic trees and standing 
crops, livestock, and farm equipment (Bardhan and Udry 1999). As these assets are not 
perfect as collateral assets with the moral hazard problems, collateral substitutes such as 
third-party loan guarantees, interlinked transactions, and a joint liability are also widely 
used for risk diffusion. 
With spatially limited and costly information as well as costly and time-consuming 
contract enforcement in SSA, lenders operating beyond a community have to devote 
considerable resources to screening and monitoring borrowers to mitigate the problems 
of adverse selection and moral hazard. ‘Outside’ formal agents are not able to access the 
social sanctions that are available to informal localized lenders in this type of setting. 
On account of all these institutional conditions, both formal and informal lending 
institutions attempt to minimize risk through loan administration practices that place 
greater emphasis on screening than on monitoring or contract enforcement. Further, in 
such extreme institution- and information-constrained economies, lenders’ perceptions 
about different categories of borrowers are frequently used as a first step towards 
screening. 
We now turn to the key features of risk management methods adopted by formal and 
informal lenders found in our survey.14  
3.1 Risk perception, screening and monitoring 
Formal finance 
Risk perception and loan screening. It is more difficult and costly for formal institutions 
to obtain accurate information about smaller borrowers. Our fieldwork confirms that 
banks' risk perceptions are less favourable for small borrowers, which is well known by 
such small borrowers. So these small borrowers are less likely to pass a first hurdle in 
accessing formal credit. Furthermore, many banks confirmed that the higher interest 
rates charged for smaller borrowers are attributed to differences in perceived risk. The 
increased centralization of loan administration under reform programmes to achieve 
greater control over loan quality has often led to increased risk aversion, contrary to the 
hope that market liberalization would expand the scope of banking operations to a wider 
group of private agents. 
Equally, in screening, banks are disadvantaged in acquiring information on personal 
integrity. While they try to obtain information about potential borrowers and their 
current indebtedness from third parties (including approaching other banks for 
references), their attempts are usually unsuccessful. The most reliable information banks 
can access is borrowers’ account history available at their own branches. Given this 
situation, judgements are based largely on project documentation and bankers’ personal 
knowledge of the proposed projects. They can carry out major feasibility studies, which 
inevitably increase screening costs. As standard practice in the screening process, 
project sites of small agricultural and large enterprise clients are visited. Indeed, time 
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spent in verifying information for project analysis, with its associated salary and support 
costs, was cited to be the largest single impediment to lending to small borrowers, as the 
fixed costs of acquiring information that is independent of loan size are viewed too 
high. In assessing project creditworthiness, the return on projects is mentioned as the 
most important criterion by all the bankers surveyed. 
Many banks, especially those undergoing reform, recognize the problems caused by the 
absence of credit reference bureaux and poor interbank co-operation. The lack of good 
market information on supply, demand, and costs also hinders project assessment. 
Banks increasingly recognize the need to pursue more character-based assessments for 
small borrowers who cannot supply the documentation and financial information 
demanded for project appraisal. Despite this, reforms have not yet led to any major 
changes in the assessment of creditworthiness. Banks have begun to look for alternative 
securities, such as blocked accounts and letters of undertaking, but landed property 
remains the dominant form of collateral.  
The mention of collateral in the lending criteria of nearly all lenders suggests that it is 
used as a substitute for effective appraisal of the entrepreneur and project. Interestingly, 
while banks insist that they consider the viability of projects as the most important 
criterion in assessing applications, many small borrowers believe that their loan 
applications were rejected because of a lack of collateral. The foreclosure of collateral 
property is difficult in many African countries, in view of the ambiguities surrounding 
property rights. Thus, collateral requirement and restricted options for collateral assets and 
substitutes are likely to act as a credit rationing device, excluding many otherwise 
creditworthy small borrowers from formal credit.  
As loan screening is costly, there is some evidence from our fieldwork to confirm the 
theoretical prediction that lenders are more likely to enter into repetitive games. In 
Nigeria banks tend to have a long-standing relationship with their large clients. For both 
commercial and merchant banks, there were far less first-time borrowers than repeat 
borrowers. The same situation was repeated in Ghana for large borrowers and in Malawi 
for all types of borrowers. Other forms of ‘tests’, such as the provision of a small initial 
loan, were rarely applied. Less than 10 per cent of bank managers in Ghana indicated 
they had provided initial advances to any type of borrower. This may be explained by 
the screening methods whereby greater emphasis is given to the quality of projects than 
borrower characteristics. 
Loan monitoring. We found little evidence of extensive loan monitoring in our bank 
branch surveys in Ghana, Nigeria, and Tanzania.15 Monitoring was more often 
conducted through accounts than projects. This failure of banks to make extensive 
project visits does not necessarily indicate a lack of concern about moral hazard. Rather, 
it was the result of pressures to cut costs. Also many banks in SSA, particularly 
government-owned banks, lack the transport equipment for regular project visits. In 
Malawi only, loan monitoring dominated the loan administration process, mainly 
because agricultural borrowers are usually large plantation owners and are within easy 
reach of urban bank branches. 
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Informal finance 
Risk perceptions and loan screening. Informal lenders generally contend that they do 
not attach different risks to borrowers within their usual clientele. In group-based 
arrangements, borrowers are pre-selected by membership requirements. Traders lend 
only to people with whom they have a trading relationship. Moneylenders are the only 
informal lenders that do not lend to distinct groups of clients. Given the lack of 
competitive pressure, moneylenders respond to possible risk variations by charging 
uniformly high-risk premium for all loans, rather than charging different interest rates to 
different borrowers. They rationalize their high rates as reflecting socially acceptable 
norms.  
Screening in the informal sector relies extensively on personal knowledge of borrowers 
as suggested by Udry (1990, 1994) and Yotopoulos and Floro (1991). The development 
of personal ties and proximity are mechanisms for countering the effects of adverse 
selection and moral hazard. Such familiarity with a borrower reduces the significance of 
repeat borrowing, and a repetitive relationship only becomes important if the lender has 
no other means for verifying information about a borrower. The more rural the 
environment, the greater the need to personalize ties in confronting information 
asymmetry, as observed by Udry (1990, 1994) in Northern Nigeria where agricultural 
lending is, as a norm, conducted among relatives, acquaintances, and neighbours.  
In general, more than two-thirds of successful applicants were personal acquaintances of 
lenders in individually-managed arrangements. Many West African moneylenders, who 
do not show a preference for repeat lending, attach a lot of importance to the 
recommendation of previous clients with information on the personal character of a new 
client rather than his/her indebtedness. West African savings collectors are often 
indifferent between repeat and first-time borrowers, as the key piece of information for 
them is whether cash flows are sufficient to make daily deposits possible.  
While interlinked credit markets are often seen as a major aspect of informal credit 
transactions in developing countries (Yotopoulos and Floro 1991; Bardhan 1989)), we 
found few in our sample. This is consistent with the observation made about production 
relations in semi-arid Africa: that the tied market relations are limited and inefficient as 
a collateral substitute (Binswanger et.al 1989). Most moneylenders in Ghana and 
Nigeria did not require a business relationship with applicants for loan approval. The 
largest incidence of interlinked transactions was observed in Tanzania where linking 
credit to land titles effectively became a way of buying land in a system where land 
sales were not possible. In Malawi, interlinked transactions are observed between estate 
owners and labourers/ tenants in tobacco plantations. 
In group-based arrangements such as Rotating Saving and Credit Associations 
(ROSCAs) or non-rotating Savings and Credit Associations (SCAs), where only 
members received loans, all borrowers are known. Effectively, they do not screen loans 
but screen membership based on the applicant's character, trustworthiness, and 
commitment to the group’s goals. In general, the methods of client selection used by 
informal lenders and groups effectively reduce the risk of dealing with small borrowers. 
Thus, their clientele-borrowers may be thought of as low-risk, even though they would be 
perceived as high-risk by formal lenders. 
Loan monitoring. It is often suggested that the opportunity for frequent and easy loan 
monitoring is one way by which informal lenders are able to reduce the incidence of   12
default (Yotopoulos and Floro 1991). Contrary to this notion, we observed little attempt 
by informal lenders to monitor the use of loans explicitly. Our evidence supports Udry's 
(1990) position that informal lenders have little need to monitor loans explicitly because 
of free information flow in their operating circles. 
In Tanzania, only two of the 19 Savings and Credit Societies (SCS) reported any form 
of loan monitoring. For West African savings collectors, loan monitoring is taken for 
granted as daily visits to clients for deposit collection ensures that loans are monitored. 
Moneylenders in Ghana and Nigeria and other informal groups in most countries 
indicated that they did not bother with monitoring. The situation is different only for 
estate owners in Malawi who provide loans as part of interlinked market arrangements 
that require regular interaction between lender and borrower. 
3.2 Loan repayment and contract enforcement 
Formal finance 
Loan repayment trends vary considerably across bank types.16 Some of the most 
disappointing bank loan repayment records were in Tanzania where poor contract 
enforcement characterizes the whole banking system and there was a serious 
deterioration in banks’ loan portfolios in the adjustment period.17 The proportion of 
non-performing loans for commercial banks in Tanzania was between 80 and 86 per 
cent (Bagachwa 1996). 
In Nigeria, both publicly-owned banks and private banks are under considerable stress. 
Given the proliferation of financial institutions following imprudent and premature 
deregulation, the problems of moral hazard and adverse selection have loomed large. In 
1992, 45 per cent of the total outstanding loans of the banking system were classified as 
non-performing. Among the distressed banks that are technically insolvent but continue 
to operate, 67 to 77 per cent of outstanding loans have been non-performing in recent 
years. These statistics do not cover non-performing loans of the development finance 
institutions (DFIs), which are believed to have non-performing loans amounting to at 
least 80 to 90 per cent of total loans. Some of the worst performances were observed in 
rural lending by large commercial banks and merchant banks. 
In Ghana, formal sector default rates are not low, but there was more variation by 
borrower type and location than in Nigeria and Tanzania. Small agricultural loans 
accounted for over 55 per cent of delinquency in the period from1988 to 1990. Actual 
defaults among them were most pronounced in development bank branches and the unit 
                                                 
16  Deschamps and Bonnardeaux (1997) estimate that for SSA non-performing loans represented at times 50 
per cent or more of total loans outstanding in the mid-1980s. 
17  An analysis of the loan portfolio at the National Bank for Commerce (NBC) showed that about 94 per 
cent was sub-standard, doubtful, or rated as loss by end-December 1991 (Eriksson 1993). NBC, drawing 
on central bank facilities, had continuously extended loans and credit to its major parastatal clientele far 
in excess of deposits mobilized. The Cooperative and Rural Development Bank (CRDB) also suffered 
from high delinquency and default rates on loans and overdraft facilities as its main borrowers were the 
cooperative unions. In all these cases, from the onset there was little prospect of repayment. Yet the 
banks continued to provide loans using implicit government guarantees.   13
rural banks. Although small loans tend to default more than large loans in numerical 
terms, large loans accounted for 55 per cent of loan amounts in default by the end of 
1991. Amounts in default by small agricultural borrowers accounted for 25 per cent. 
In Malawi, poor repayment rates for small borrowers were also observed, but the scale 
of the problem was much more contained. Furthermore, delinquency, rather than actual 
default, was more of a problem as most delinquent loans tended to be paid within 12 
months of becoming overdue. Delinquency among small enterprise borrowers stood at 
16 per cent for the same period. Interestingly, only 5 per cent of agricultural loans were 
either delinquent or in default, a figure comparable to the 2 per cent for large 
enterprises. The low default rates for agriculture may be due to the fact that in Malawi 
these loans are directed at large plantation owners. 
Contract enforcement. Under conditions of low repayment, one would expect contract 
enforcement to play a significant role in loan administration. However, despite a 
relatively large incidence of default, foreclosure of collateral or legal action was rarely 
observed in our case-study countries. With no legal institutions to enforce contracts 
effectively and the absence of bankruptcy laws and procedures, the attitude of banks to 
contract enforcement is subtle. The first line of action is to persuade delinquent 
borrowers to resume their payments. Most Ghanaian bankers indicated that delinquency 
and default tended not to be wilful, but instead due to poor returns on investments, 
particularly because of bad management of small enterprise projects.18 About 85 per 
cent of bank managers interviewed in Ghana indicated that they often re-finance 
projects to revive distressed borrowers. However, these banks do not have access to 
sufficient information to arrange state-contingent loan contracts for borrowers who are 
do not default wilfully. Nor are there many effective mechanisms available to banks to 
enforce wilfully defaulted borrowers. 
Informal finance 
Loan repayment. Our surveys confirm the view that delinquency and default rates in the 
informal sector are relatively low (Udry 1990, 1994). In Ghana between 70 and 80 per 
cent of our entire sample of informal lenders reported that they had no delinquent 
borrowers in 1990 and 1991. Among those who had, they usually represented less than 
5 per cent. The largest proportion of defaulting borrowers was observed in rural credit 
unions and co-operatives with hundreds of members, where defaulters averaged 30 per 
cent of borrowers. While Malawian and Tanzanian default rates were also low, slightly 
higher delinquency rates were observed in Nigeria. There, 14 per cent of borrowers with 
moneylenders were delinquent; as were 17 per cent with SCAs and 20 per cent with 
esusu collector borrowers. As in other countries, all lenders believed that delinquent 
borrowers would repay within three months of the loan maturing. Default rates in rural 
Nigeria were significantly lower than those in urban Nigeria, which is in accordance 
with Udry’s (1990) findings. 
In rural areas, non-payment is generally attributed to borrowers’ cash flow problems 
while many urban lenders think it is a mixture of cash flow problems and low 
                                                 
18  This contrasts with the Nigerian case, where quite a number of bankers believe that some default is 
willful and where collusion between borrowers and some bank officials is observed.   14
commitment on the part of borrowers to settle debts. Cross-tabulating perceptions on the 
causes of default to loan end-use suggests, however, that lenders providing loans for 
consumption purposes and trading tend to be more concerned with strategic default than 
those lending to farmers. The latter are more concerned about failed projects, arising out 
of random production and income shocks, leading to default. Within local communities 
where the free flow of information is guaranteed, loan contracts could be structured as 
state-contingent contracting without a fear of moral hazard. Udry (1990, 1994) reports 
that in the villages of Northern Nigeria such state-contingent contracting is used as a 
risk-pooling mechanism against idiosyncratic shocks within the village. Under such 
arrangements, realized interest rates and repayment periods are adjusted for households 
who have experienced adverse shocks. Needless to say, however, such arrangements 
can not be used against village-wide systemic shocks. 
Contract enforcement. While repayment trends in the semi-formal and informal sectors 
are much better, it is seldom the result of more ‘aggressive’ contract enforcement 
procedures, as suggested by Shipton (1991). We found little evidence of litigation. To 
start with, informal lenders effectively screen out ‘costly’ borrowers in the case of non-
payment. Once delinquency becomes an issue, they apply the most effective but least 
costly enforcement mechanisms at hand case by case. Hence, contract enforcement 
mechanisms vary significantly depending on lender-borrower relationships. Effective 
tools are often embedded in the personalized relationships through the extended family, 
friendship, and other social relationships. Among group-based arrangements and in rural 
areas, mechanisms such as peer pressure or a potential use of social stigmatization are 
effective. Udry (1990) reports the case where an appeal to community authorities by a 
lender in response to a perceived default results in a prompt repayment. Ironically, when 
the number of defaulters in a rural co-operative arrangement is large, the sanction of 
stigmatizing an individual fails to be effective. Where lenders cannot depend on moral 
suasion alone, they apply other mechanisms. 
In Tanzania, the use of interlinked transactions enables an expansion of the control 
variables to influence the borrower's actions (Bagachwa 1995). An interlinked 
transaction can thus be treated as a disguised form of collateral.19 Granting usufruct 
rights to lenders, such as tree pledging, is also common among cocoa farmers in western 
Africa (Adegboye 1969). In the absence of these mechanisms, collateral assumes a 
greater role in risk management. Thus, more Ghanaian lenders than their Tanzanian 
counterparts demanded collateral in the form of physical assets such as buildings, 
farmland, and undeveloped land or non-physical securities such as guarantees from 
friends, relations, or employers. About 83 per cent of Ghanaian moneylenders and 76 
per cent of credit unions require security against loans.  
Although informal lenders do not generally resort to foreclosure on collateral or 
expensive legal actions, they do hold onto collateral to guarantee eventual repayment. It 
is certainly easier for a cocoa farmer to hold on to a confiscated cocoa farm indefinitely 
                                                 
19  Land-based credit market interlinkages are popular in Tanzania because these are the simplest way of 
acquiring the usufructuary rights to land. This situation gives rise to a lending game in which borrowers’ 
defaults are favourable for the lender as his utility is enhanced. However, Udry (1990) reports that the 
use of collateral and interlinked contracts is absent within rural communities in Northern Nigeria 
where information asymmetries are unimportant. This is the case despite the fact that each of the 
sample villages has active land sales markets and land is available to serve as a collateral asset.   15
than for a bank. Banks are not able to seize collateral as storage or maintenance costs 
can be prohibitive. Hence, borrowers would not treat the threat of collateral confiscation 
by an informal lender as lightly as for a formal lender, and this could affect their 
attitudes to repayment between the two sectors. 
4  Estimates of transaction costs 
While the costs of acquiring information affect the choice of risk management methods, 
the transaction costs are determined by both the method and the effectiveness of risk 
management applied. The transaction costs of lending are the sum of the costs of 
administering credit (loan screening, monitoring, and contract enforcement) and the 
costs of the risk of default, defined as ‘those expenses for the risk of loan default 
incurred by the lending institutions, for example, provision for loan losses, the loan 
guarantee fees paid, and the actual bad debts incurred’ (Saito and Villanueva 1981). In 
this section, we relate risk management practices to transaction costs. 
Formal finance 
Although most banks base cost calculations on their standard overhead costs, we 
measured transaction costs for each type of lender, separately for administrative costs 
and default risk costs.20 Our analysis shows that the cost structure reflects the relative 
importance attached to the different components of risk management. 
In Ghana, commercial banks concentrate more on screening expenditure.21 An 
exception to this is the administration of small agricultural loans, for which all banks 
allocated an average 40 per cent of the resources for monitoring loans, more than double 
that for other types of loans. In contrast, Nigerian banks spend less on screening (15 per 
cent of loan administration costs) but find themselves incurring higher costs on loan 
monitoring and contract enforcement. This may be attributed to a more pervasive fear of 
moral hazard and wilful default in Nigeria. The marginal cost for administering each 
loan is as indicated in Table 1. 
                                                 
20  See Nissanke and Aryeetey (1998) for our estimates of the breakdown of these costs for Ghana and 
Nigeria, and discussions of trends in Malawi and Tanzania, which are based on perceptions of bank staff 
and research associates. See Aryeetey (1994) for a detailed description of methodology used in our 
estimates. 
21    Many commercial banks in Ghana insisted on a more thorough screening process. This resulted in 
relatively low default rates and less enforcement costs. This, however, has led to relatively fewer loan 
approvals by commercial banks, indicating their high risk aversion.   16
Table 1: Loan administration costs as a percentage (%) of loan amount 







agriculture  Others 
Ghana  1.7 0.2 3.5 1.4 
Malawi*  3.4 17.6 8.9 13.5 
Nigeria  12.9 18.9 12.3 11.4 
Tanzania**  12.4  -- -- -- 
Source: Nissanke and Aryeetey (1998). 
* Based only on staff time allocations. ** Not broken down by sector. 
Table 2: Transaction costs of lending in Ghana as a proportion of total loan amount for sector by 
type of bank 







agriculture   Others 
Commercial  bank  3.2 1.8 6.4  4.1 
Development bank  8.7  8.0  10.6  8.2 
Unit rural bank  5.8  --  3.9  3.0 
Overall  5.9 4.9 6.9  5.1 
Source: Nissanke and Aryeetey (1998). 
While many small borrowers are already excluded from the sample because of 
screening, our survey data does not validate the popular assertion that small loans cost 
more to transact than larger ones. The overall administration costs are also correlated 
with the degree of centralization of decision-making, as greater centralization increases 
screening costs. For example, the cost differential between small enterprises and large 
ones in Malawi is related to the degree of centralization of decision-making between the 
two types of loans, as the amounts sought by small enterprises fall within the lending 
limits of branch managers. Much higher costs incurred by Nigerian banks across 
different borrower types are also attributable to more centralized decision-making, 
larger overheads, and larger branch networks than their Ghanaian counterparts. The 
high loan administration costs for the small enterprise sector in Nigeria also reflect the 
greater engagement by merchant banks in this type of lending. 
For Ghana, where we obtained estimates on default risk costs, total transactions costs 
were measured as in Table 2.22 
                                                 
22  While we expect transaction costs in Nigeria and Tanzania to be much higher than those for Ghana, 
Malawian transaction costs should not be very different.   17
For all types of borrowers, the transaction costs were highest for development banks, 
where loan administration costs per branch were lowest. Clearly, their administration 
methods put a premium on default risk, as it was their high provisions for bad debts that 
increased their transaction costs. Significant over-estimations of default risks are 
common for other banks too. Our estimates of the average transaction costs for small 
enterprise lending and small agricultural loans are comparable to those incurred by 
development banks in the Philippines, reported in Saito and Villanueva (1981). The 
major difference arises for large enterprises: our estimate of 4.9 per cent for this 
category is more than twice their average of 2.1 per cent.  
Further, it is worth noting that transaction costs in the range of 5 to 7 per cent would 
account for less than a half of interest rate spreads in Ghana. Thus, the high and 
increasing spreads observed in the adjustment period cannot be totally explained by 
high transaction costs, and may instead reflect a lack of competition among banks. 
However, high spreads in the other countries may be more closely related to high 
transaction costs, on account of their higher administration costs (Table 1). The high 
transaction cost of arranging loans also explains why banks prefer roll-over overdraft 
facilities with low cost-risk configuration, or investing in low-risk and high-return 
government papers and bank bills. 
Informal finance 
The transaction costs of informal lenders are much lower than those incurred by formal 
ones (Table 3).23 Most costs are incurred in the screening process, which dominates 
their risk management. Their screening costs are low because they rely extensively on a 
pre-selection of clients. Any attempt to break out of their traditional segment will 
require new operating principles and additional information-gathering costs. This 
explains why all informal lenders behave as moneylenders when they lend to non-
members: a new risk is introduced, for which a premium has to be charged. 






co-operative Credit  union 
  Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban  Rural  Urban Rural 
Ghana    1.8 2.7 0.9 0.6 0.3  0.3  2.6 4.4 
Malawi   0.6  0.6   --   --  0.2  0.2  0.4  0.1 
Nigeria  3.2 2.7 0.6 0.6  1.0 0.6 1.9  0.6 
Tanzania  1.7  2.6   --   --  0.1  0.1  2.5  3.0 
Source: Nissanke and Aryeetey (1998). 
                                                 
23  The estimates shown in Table 3 cover only loan administration costs, not default risk costs. However, the 
latter should be low in view of low default rates for informal lenders. See Nissanke and Aryeetey (1998) 
for the detailed breakdown of loan administration costs.   18
In general, costs increase as the operations of informal entities become more formal. 
Thus, the cost of more formal credit unions in Accra was on average twice that of co-
operatives. It is hard, however, to attribute the phenomenal differences in interest rates 
charged across informal lenders to the differences in loan administration cost shown 
here. The ability of some commercial informal lenders to extract a monopoly rent is 
confirmed by our survey data. For example, the mean monthly interest rates charged by 
money lenders are 10 per cent, 19 per cent, 8 per cent and 48 per cent in Ghana, Nigeria, 
Tanzania, and Malawi respectively. Naturally, the share of monopoly rent in the interest 
rates is a function of the degree of competition prevailing in a particular market.24 
Furthermore, an analysis of interest rates charged by commercial informal lenders must 
allow compensation for transaction costs, risk premiums, and the opportunity costs of 
funds, as well as monopoly rents or profits (Bottomley 1975).  
For a more accurate picture on this question it is necessary to estimate the cost of funds. 
This requires data on interest payments on deposits and their handling costs, returns on 
alternative investments (the opportunity costs of lending), and interest payments on 
loans taken for lending. Although we have only limited data from Ghana and Malawi 
on some of these parameters, a number of general points can be made. First, the lack of 
access that informal units have to banks for on-lending means that there are few 
borrowed funds involved. Second, for most informal units, deposit mobilization incurs 
insignificant costs. For example, saving collectors who receive payment for taking 
deposits may have a negative cost of funds.25 For a typical one month loan from an 
esusu collector in Accra, the total transaction cost was equivalent to -5.3 per cent of 
loan amount. Considering the monthly lending rate of 3.3 per cent, there is a 
substantially large spread of more than 8 percentage points.26 
The opportunity cost of funds can also be fairly low, depending on where lenders would 
have invested otherwise. For ROSCA members, low opportunity costs can be inferred 
by the fact that their operations remain sustainable, even though no interest is paid on 
the funds deposited by members. The opportunity cost of funds for moneylenders may 
also be low, as they are known to lend out ‘temporarily idle’ funds over the very short 
term. Their loan default risks are effectively contained and the costs involved are not 
high. 
Given these preliminary observations, the high interest rates charged by moneylenders 
are difficult to justify in terms of the high rates of default, the high correlation among 
defaults, and the high cost of screening loan applicants and pursuing delinquent 
borrowers (as suggested by Aleem (1990) in relation to a rural credit market in 
                                                 
24   In the case of interlinked credit transactions, the contestability of linked markets should be taken into 
account. 
25  They only earn interest on their deposits (mainly demand deposits) with the bank if their balances exceed 
¢1 million continuously for half of the year, which means that there is usually no interest foregone. 
Aryeetey and Steel (1992) measured the cost of funds as the implicit daily interest rate on fixed deposits 
accumulated over 30 days, or -0.2 per cent, representing the collectors’ fee. This was equivalent to -6.3 
per cent of average loan amount per month or -54.4 per cent per annum. 
26  For the other informal lenders in Ghana, the cost of funds was usually between 0 and 0.1 per cent, thus 
also giving them substantial spreads. In Malawi as well, the cost of funds for all informal lenders was 
estimated to be insignificant.   19
Pakistan). In the countries studied here, the high returns realized by moneylenders could 
be interpreted as monopoly profit from operating in incomplete, uncompetitive markets. 
While it is admittedly hazardous to compare interest rates on informal credit because of 
the highly heterogeneous nature of loan products,27 wide differential returns across 
different segments of the informal market cannot be justified by risk differentials or cost 
differentials alone. 
5  Summary and conclusion: market structure and institutional constraints 
for market transformation  
Our discussion shows that the demarcation of the boundaries of specialization is 
determined by each lender's attempts to mitigate the problems caused by information 
asymmetry and to contain risks and transaction costs. Both formal and informal lenders 
largely pre-select clients on the basis of the availability of information and the means of 
managing risks. Each market segment thus formed serves distinct socio-economic 
groups with structurally differentiated financial products. 
This condition is related to a variety of institutional constraints. The internal 
shortcomings of the formal financial sector, such as inadequate supervisory and 
regulatory provisions, are compounded by poor legal mechanisms for contract 
enforcement, inappropriate incentive environments, and restricted flows of information, 
the combination of which increases the riskiness of lending. Each lender’s preference 
for a particular risk management method is shaped in this institutional environment, 
while attempts to confront the increased riskiness have differential impacts on 
transaction costs. Faced with various institutional constraints, the range of clientele 
served by each lender is both narrow and polarized at the extreme market-ends. 
For example, the cost of acquiring reliable information on idiosyncratic risks of 
potential borrowers is prohibitive for formal institutions. Hence, the type of information 
sought by, and available to, banks about small borrowers during the screening process is 
less reliable and qualitatively different from that collected by informal lenders. Hence, 
banks are forced to devote relatively more resources to monitoring and contract 
enforcement than informal lenders or groups. Despite these efforts and resources 
expended, banks’ loan repayment rates continue to be poorer, and hence banks have to 
absorb high default-risk costs into their transaction costs. 
In contrast, informal financial market segments have long-developed devices and 
mechanisms for coping with agency problems within geographically and socially 
confined community settings. These mechanisms used by heterogeneous informal 
associations and agents are firmly rooted in indigenous social codes and norms. They 
are anchored in institutional set-ups tested over many decades, if not centuries. 
                                                 
27    For example, Basu (1989) argues that in rural credit markets, where open discrimination among 
borrowers within a community is not in accord with social norms, the interest rate structure becomes a 
choice variable of the lender. Interest variation in relation to the duration, size, and purpose of loans 
between borrowers could serve as a subtle system of price discrimination in lenders’ risk 
management.   20
Indeed, informal units enjoy considerable advantages in information and transaction 
costs when they deal with their traditional clientele. They possess a competitive edge in 
risk management and transaction costs in small credit provision within local networks as 
well as in small and short-term savings mobilization, which are difficult for formal 
institutions to tap for reasons of size-sensitive costs. 
This condition points to the potential in exploiting the comparative advantages of the 
informal financial sector to promote financial sector development. We have argued in 
Nissanke and Aryeetey (1998) that the capacity of financial systems could be enhanced 
if integrative mechanisms between formal and informal segments are developed that can 
reduce operational constraints facing each sector, and at the same time capitalize on the 
comparative advantages conferred by each sector. Even though markets incorporate 
both formal and informal segments, a financial system could perform its function more 
efficiently if the potential benefits from specialization of each sector could be properly 
exploited. Such integrative mechanisms could facilitate ‘crowding-in’ synergy effects 
between informal and formal financial institutions, as Conning and Udry (2005) also 
suggest. For this potential to be realized there should be dynamic and operative 
interactions between the segments through overlapping players, and market signals 
should be transmitted across the sectors.28 For example, in a number of Asian countries 
a heterogeneous and dynamic informal financial sector has continued to exist as part of 
the financial systems. Yet in these economies, market integration has taken place and 
the intermediation efficiency of the system as a whole has increased over time, as 
specialization in financial services by each sector has progressed (Biggs 1991; Ghate 
1990).29 
Referring to some Asian economies where a continuum or a semblance of an integrated 
financial system is observed, Ghate (1988) suggests that: 
the two sectors are substitutes over a range of credit needs that occupy 
the middle range of a spectrum of credit markets and purposes. Within 
this range they impinge on each other’s share of the market, depending 
on lending and borrowing rates in each sector. At both ends of the 
spectrum, however, each occupies a number of markets which can   
not be served by the other and which are therefore complementary.   
(Ghate 1988: 75) 
In short, the integrated financial system has a ‘captive’ segment and a ‘contested’ 
segment. 
It can be argued that the financial system as a whole becomes more competitive if the 
range of demand, non-exclusive to one sector (that is the contested segment), expands. 
In the presence of overlapping demand, there are also spillover effects from the formal 
to the informal segments. For example, Bell (1990) shows that when informal lenders 
act as intermediaries for formal institutions, the resulting lower cost of funds to informal 
lenders will be passed on to borrowers, depending on the degree of competition in the 
                                                 
28  See Jain (1999) for discussion on formal-informal sector interaction in an adverse selection setting. 
29   See Nissanke (1998) for more detailed discussion on comparison of market structure in Asia and 
Africa.   21
informal market. Thus, where demand is non-exclusive, that is, overlapping, direct 
credit links can have a positive effect on the efficiency of financial systems. 
In SSA, there have been few functional linkages between and within different market 
segments. To start with, direct institutional linkages are insignificant. While there are 
direct deposit links between banks and some informal agents/associations, savings of 
informal agents are kept in non-interest bearing demand deposits for safe-keeping, and, 
as such, are seldom intermediated for investment due to conservative asset management 
on the part of banks (Nissanke and Aryeetey 1998; Aryeetey and Steel 1992). There are 
few direct linkages in credit allocation between banks and traditional informal 
operators. 
Indirect links among different market segments are also weak with the extremely 
narrow range of overlapping demand for financial services. Neither complementarity 
nor competition are generally observed in financial market relationships.   
De-facto financial intermediation, which involves on-lending by large enterprises to 
smaller sub-contractors, has not been observed on the scale found in some Asian 
countries, partly as a result of the limited scope for backward and forward linkages in 
real sector activities in SSA. Nor has an extensive ‘credit layering’ of wholesale and 
retail provision of services been reported. 
Overall, flows of funds and information are insignificant between segments and access 
by clients to financial products is extremely limited with little substitution and 
overlapping demand. Under such prevailing conditions, formal and informal sectors 
often form almost discrete financial enclaves. With few linkages among segments,   
the scope for information-sharing or risk-pooling/sharing has been limited. 
Informational advantages possessed by informal agents have not been effectively 
capitalized on as a means for achieving a more efficient system of financial 
intermediation. 
A specific market structure has emerged in which institutional arrangements have 
become barriers for interaction across segments. Markets are characterized by an 
extreme degree of fragmentation, which gives agents in each segment the opportunity to 
exploit market power. In fragmented markets, risk-adjusted returns are not comparable 
across segments. Cost variations observed among different types of lenders cannot 
account for the large differences in loan prices. Interest rates diverge significantly 
across and within segments, reflecting the severity of market fragmentation. As the 
range of the captive segment far exceeds that of the contested segment, structural 
characteristics of these potentially monopolistic competitive markets are skewed 
towards imperfect competition. 
Severely constrained by institutional conditions, financial units specialize in a very 
narrow range of products. This has led to a situation where, not only do financial 
markets become too fragmented to allow risk-adjusted returns to converge, but 
considerable gaps in financial services have emerged. The financing gaps absorb all 
those potential borrowers that either fail to meet the lending criteria of various existing   22
lenders, or find their products unattractive. They are either too large for informal lenders 
or too small for formal lenders.30 
With the fundamental problems faced by formal and informal institutions/agents 
unresolved each segment continues to struggle with its respective operational 
constraints. On the one hand, despite the flexibility and adaptability shown by some 
informal financial arrangements, the characteristics of informal agents/groups are such 
that the growth of operations within the informal sector is severely limited in SSA. 
In effect, informal financial units operate continuously as personalized transactions, 
largely in a repeated-game framework. Their heavy reliance on localized, personal 
information often prevents them from transforming into full-scale intermediaries. Their 
risk management is valid as self-reinforcing contracts within a limited community/local 
setting. It relies extensively on traditional social institutions and mechanisms which are 
based on the village and kin groups for informal insurance arrangements. While these 
have provided informal social safety nets and redistributional mechanisms, local lenders 
are granted the opportunity of using their privileged personalized information about the 
borrower as an entry barrier to the local credit market. This has injected a more 
monopolistic element into market structure.  
On the other hand, formal institutions implanted externally in the colonial period or 
created by governments at independence do not have a firm anchor in indigenous social 
institutions. African states are often regarded to be operating with ‘soft state’ 
institutions (Platteau 1996). The formal legal systems and the concepts of private 
property rights are seen as ‘foreign’ to many local settings, and hence lack support and 
legitimacy in local culture and social norms.31 In the absence of functional institutions 
to support their operations, banks suffer from a legacy of either conservatism or 
financial distress, characterized by high transaction costs and severe loan recovery 
problems. This is despite their potential advantage in exploiting economies of scale in 
portfolio management and diversification to allow spatial risk-pooling and maturity 
transformation.  
As outside agencies, formal financial institutions do not have access to local 
information about the borrower. Consequently, their methods of loan screening and 
monitoring are costly and imperfect. Therefore, using collateral requirements as a credit 
rationing device for small borrowers, they concentrate their loan portfolio on larger 
formal (often public) enterprises. The performance of these enterprises is not necessarily 
rigorously screened and monitored. With the weak formal systems of contract 
enforcement, implicit government guarantees against the failure of large formal 
institutions can ultimately be used as a last resort. In SSA, such guarantees have to be 
largely underwritten by foreign aid. This condition could engender and perpetuate a 
culture of ‘aid dependency’. 
 
                                                 
30  See Nissanke (1998) for the implication of this gap in financial services for real sector development 
and diversification in SSA.  
31  Transaction costs associated with monitoring and enforcement could be lowered if exercising social 
and moral norms would lead to a reduction of opportunistic behaviour (Vandenberg 1999).   23
Thus, the institutional environment prevailing in SSA is not yet fully capable of 
supporting transactions taking place beyond local communities. This condition has led 
many researchers to conclude that African economies appear to be locked into the low 
developmental stage where ‘a dense social network leads to the development of fairly 
stable informal structures, such as customs, trust and normative rules which give an 
informal institutional framework for organizing activities’ (Aron 1997). One of the 
critical questions to be addressed in relation to African economic development is to 
create institutional conditions where private agents operating in informal arrangements 
feel prepared to transform into more formal units conducive to productive activities 
promising higher social and private returns. For this to happen, however, the 
institutional environment would need to undergo fundamental structural transformation 
in order to underpin market transformation on a sustainable basis. 
In Nissanke and Aryeetey (1998), we spelt out some institutional measures to accelerate 
the process of integration of hitherto fragmented informal and formal market segments. 
We emphasized the possibility of financial sector development, building on the 
strengths of informal institutions in SSA. Here it may suffice to note that, broadly 
speaking, institutional measures for financial market transformation should directly 
address the informational problems and the incentive (agency) problem, and the contract 
enforcement problems (Hoff and Stiglitz 1990; Conning and Udry 2005). These should 
therefore encompass measures aimed at: strengthening legal systems related to property 
rights safeguards and contract enforcement; accumulating information capital; 
improving the governance/incentive structure; and intensifying market network 
development.32 Special attention should also be paid to ‘institution innovation’ aimed at 
overcoming extreme market fragmentation through effective integration measures. 
Institutions, which define and limit the set of choices facing agents by providing the 
incentive structure, comprise formal rules, informal constraints, and the effectiveness of 
their enforcement (North 1990). Hence, institutional change is a multi-faceted and 
complex process, involving changes in perceptions, preferences, organizational forms, 
and agents’ behavioural patterns through the society investing in acquiring knowledge, 
co-ordination, and ‘learning by doing’ skills (North 1990 and 1997). These cannot be 
effected over the short-term. However, governments could play a positive role in 
expediting the transformation process by understanding that the changes in formal rules 
governing enforcement mechanisms have to be complemented and supported by 
incremental changes in informal constraints and ideological constructs to restructure 
human interactions and develop new conventions and norms. 
 
 
                                                 
32    North (1997) lists four major variables as a means of providing low-cost transacting and credible 
commitment, which are regarded in turn as the institutional requirements for creating efficient factor and 
product markets. They are: (1) an efficient system of property rights that reduces the cost of measuring 
contract performance; (2) an increased market size supported by mechanisms for constraining 
opportunistic behaviour; (3) credible enforcement mechanisms through improved legal systems and 
impartial adjudication; and (4) ideological attitudes and perceptions to reduce the cost of the measurement 
and enforcement of contract performances.   24
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